solve the problems of the health care system. Events of the early 1980s, in particular the economic recession, declines in private health insurance coverage, and limits on federal government spending, have all contrib uted to the current "crisis." This problem has been further exacerbated by more recent cost containment policies like Medicare's prospective pay ment system, the growth of policy strategies that are geared toward com petition, and an increasingly competitive health insurance sector in which managed care plans pressure hospitals to provide discounted rates. As a consequence, many health care institutions have been forced to curtail ac cess to care for individuals who lack health insurance (Wilensky 1988) .
Some states recognized the serious social and economic ramifications of these changes and, during the late 1980s and early 1990s, enacted specific legislation to provide health care access to the otherwise unin sured and/or to alleviate the financial burden imposed on hospitals rendering excessive levels of uncompensated care. One of the more prom ising approaches to the latter problem is the establishment of revenue pools, funded in part by the imposition of provider taxes (Bartlett 1985) . Dollars from this earmarked fund can be used to finance Medicaid ex pansions and other forms of coverage for the uninsured and/or to make lump sum payments to hospitals that serve a large proportion of indigents.
Surprisingly, despite widespread interest in this funding approach among policy makers, relatively little research exists documenting whether revenue pools generated via provider taxes are effective mecha nisms for reducing uncompensated care and improving access through insurance coverage to the medically indigent and underinsured. The few exceptions include published studies by Thorpe (1987 Thorpe ( , 1988 , Thorpe and Spencer (1991) , and Thorpe and Phelps (1992) on the impacts of the New York revenue pool. The New Jersey program has been analyzed by Rosko (1990) , Dunn and Chen (1994) , and Gaskin (1996) . Two other articles, by Jones (1989) and Brown (1993) , have discussed the Florida revenue pool in the context of evaluating the political process of im plem enting health care reform in the state. Neither author, however, conducted an empirical analysis to document the effects of the Florida revenue pool on the uninsured and uncompensated care. Research on this subject is extremely important and timely, given recent updates indicating that a substantial portion of the population lacks adequate insurance coverage. Moreover, further research on this topic is clearly warranted in light of the number of states that have established revenue pools financed via provider taxes.
This study examines the situation in Florida and evaluates whether the initiatives financed via the Florida revenue pool, known as the Pub lic Medical Assistance Trust Fund (PMATF), have improved access through its provision of insurance coverage and have m itigated the problem of uncompensated care. The Florida revenue pool, established in 1984 by the state legislature, merits analysis for a number of reasons: First, this policy mechanism is well established, as it was the second revenue pool to become operational; thus, its effects can be observed over a long period of time. Second, the funds generated from the pro vider tax are primarily used to increase access to the uninsured through Medicaid coverage and other state-sponsored indigent care programs. Only a small percentage of its revenue pool funds are allocated to make direct payments to hospitals that render high levels of uncompensated services. In contrast, nearly all the other states w ith revenue pools use their funds primarily for this purpose. Third, the provider assessment in Florida applies to all hospitals and four types of ancillary service facili ties. The Florida pool, therefore, has a more extensive funding base than other states with revenue pools because their provider assessments are only imposed on hospitals.
In the present study, we analyze Medicaid enrollment and expendi ture data, PMATF assessment and reimbursement data, and financial data on Florida hospitals to examine the following issues:
• the effect of the initiatives supported by the PMATF on the growth of uncompensated care • the effect of the initiatives supported by the PMATF on the dis tribution of uncompensated care among hospitals by ownership status • the effect of the PMATF on Medicaid enrollment and expenditures • whether PMATF assessments collected from proprietary hospitals, which typically provide relatively little uncompensated care, ex ceeded reimbursements received from Medicaid expansions, direct subsidies, and disproportionate-share payments • whether government and not-for-profit (NFP) hospitals, which typically treat a large number of indigents, received PMATF re imbursements that in aggregate exceeded PMATF assessments paid by these facilities • whether the provider tax imposed on hospitals and ancillary facili ties constitutes a stable source of financing for the revenue pool
The next section presents background information on the PMATF, followed by an examination of the growth of uncompensated care in Florida. We then describe the effects of the PMATF on access to care by the medically indigent and underinsured and go on to examine whether the PMATF has altered the amount of uncompensated care rendered by hospitals in the state. After a consideration of whether the provider assessment approach generates a stable source of financing for revenue pools, we present our conclusions and discuss the policy implications of this funding approach.
Revenue Pools and the PMATF
Perhaps one of the most noteworthy initiatives enacted to address the problem of the uninsured was the Health Care Access Act (HCAA) passed by the Florida legislature in 1984. As part of this legislation, a revenue pool was established to address the following circumstances: escalating health care costs; diminishing private health insurance cov erage; limited availability of primary and preventive care; the failure to utilize federal funding opportunities; the concentration of poor patients; and the associated burden of indigent care among relatively few pro viders. The purpose of this revenue pool was to finance Medicaid ex pansions and other primary health care programs for the medically indigent and the underinsured.
Initially, the revenue pool funds were generated from both a hospital assessment and some state general appropriations. The provider assess ment was set at 1.5 percent of the amount of revenue actually collected before expenses (net operating revenues) of all licensed hospitals in the state. In 1990, state lawmakers increased the cigarette tax by ten cents a pack and earmarked these revenues for the PMATF. In 1991 the Florida legislature expanded the fund base and imposed a 1.5 percent assessment on the annual net operating revenues of ambulatory surgical centers, clinical laboratories, freestanding radiation therapy centers, and diagnostic imaging centers. In 1992, the Florida legislature imposed a $1.50 assessment for each patient day provided by nursing homes. The industry opposed this assessment and lobbied heavily to bring about its repeal in FY 1993-94.
The Florida pooling mechanism is regarded as a highly innovative approach toward ameliorating the economic and social problems linked to the provision of uncompensated care for at least three reasons: First, revenue pools are designed to address inequities across hospitals in the provision of indigent care (Wilensky 1987) . From 1987 through 1992 a portion of the revenue pool funds were distributed by a formula to hospitals that served a disproportionate share of indigent and uninsured patients. Thus, the redistributive revenue pools are considered more equitable than alternative sources of funding (i.e., excise taxes on alco hol and cigarettes) because the insured population, whether directly or indirectly, finances health care to the uninsured. Essentially, this mecha nism formalizes the practice of cost shifting (Jones 1989 ). This ap proach seems most appropriate to accommodate the problems of states like Florida, where there are many hospitals, yet only a small proportion treat the uninsured.
Second, because the funds are partly generated from an assessment on hospital revenues and freestanding ancillary facilities, the financing of programs for the uninsured increases in accordance w ith the costs of care. This approach therefore avoids the problems associated w ith pro grams that depend extensively on state and local revenues for support. Extensive reliance on state and local funds tends to be problematic because during recessionary periods unemployment rises, state and local revenues decline, and the number of uninsured increases. In contrast, the assessment imposed on hospitals and health care facilities special izing in outpatient services constitutes a more stable source of revenue.
Third, many other states that finance uncompensated care through revenue pools (i.e., New York, New Jersey, Ohio, and Massachusetts) have used these funds solely to reimburse hospitals providing high lev els of charity care. Because services rendered outside the hospital are not covered, allocating funds only to hospitals promotes overutilization of services rendered in the most expensive care settings (emergency room and other hospital-based facilities). More im portant, when lum p sum payments are made to hospitals, there is no guarantee that they will be earmarked to provide services to uninsured persons. The Florida ap proach avoids this "leaky bucket'7 phenomenon (Thorpe 1988) because it allocates most of the funds to finance Medicaid expansions.
The PMATF is used to support several programs, all of which m iti gate the problem of uncompensated care. First, the state expanded Med icaid coverage to targeted groups of uninsured persons (see table 1). Second, to compensate hospitals for Medicaid shortfalls, the state in creased reimbursement levels for hospitals; physician fees were also in- First, it provided a federal matching of funds w ith a high degree of flexibility regarding eligibility requirements. Second, the results could be easily predicted because the adjustments were deter mined using prior year hospital financial records, yet payment was made for every Medicaid reimbursement in the current year. Finally, adminis trative expenses could be minimized because the DSH adjustments were added to the Medicaid payments received regularly by hospitals. After 1992, however, PMATF dollars were no longer allocated to fund DSH payments to hospitals. The programs and policy changes financed through the fund since inception are described in chronological order in table 1.
Uncompensated Care in Florida
Published estimates indicate that there were 2,242,000 nonelderly per sons without health insurance in Florida in 1986; this represented 23.2 percent of the nonelderly population. The corresponding number and percentage nationally were 37,027,000, or 17.8 percent. Thus, in 1986, Florida's rate of persons lacking insurance exceeded the national aver age (Chollet 1988) . By 1994, the proportion of the nonelderly popu lation nationally lacking insurance declined slightly, to 17.4 percent (39,718,000 persons). The corresponding number and percentage for Florida in 1994 were 2,457,000, or 20.9 percent (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1996). Thus, Florida's rate of uninsured persons declined rela tively more over this period, although in absolute terms the Florida rate still exceeded the national average. Some of the concern over the lack of health care coverage among the nonelderly population stems from the fact that uninsured patients generate significant dollar amounts of un compensated care. Therefore, before considering the impact of the PMATF on the provision of uncompensated care in Florida, it is im portant to assess the severity of the problem in the state. Table 2 presents information regarding the amounts of uncompen sated care provided by Florida hospitals over the period 1983 through 1991. A lthough we report both nominal and real dollar amounts, our discussion focuses on real dollar changes. D uring this nine-year period, the real dollar increase in uncompensated care was $553.6 million, or (Dubay, Norton, and Moon 1993) . Although these trends are only descriptive, they provide some indication that extending access to the ::::ed in Florida uninsured has been instrum ental in controlling the dollar volume of uncompensated care. Previous research indicates that most uninsured patients are treated at teaching, public, and NFP hospitals, whereas investor-owned facili ties serve relatively few of these patients (Wilensky 1984) . To ascertain whether these associations exist among Florida hospitals, we examined the relation between ownership status and uncompensated care dollars. Table 3 shows that in 1983, most of the $586.5 million of uncompen sated care was provided by public and not-for-profit (NFP) hospitals, approximately 41.4 and 42.6 percent, respectively. Investor-owned fa cilities, in contrast, rendered a smaller share of uncompensated care, only $93.8 million, or 16 percent of the statewide total. The expansions supported in part by the PMATF appear to have had negligible effects on the distribution of uncompensated care by ownership type among Florida hospitals. In 1991, the shares borne by NFP, government, and for-profit hospitals were 47.3 percent, 36.7 percent, and 16 percent, respectively. Given that the number of government hospitals decreased from 50 to 27 over the nine-year period, it is not surprising that NFP institutions experienced the largest increase in dollar volume of uncom pensated care; their real dollar increase was 116 percent.
The financial burden imposed on hospitals that render substantial amounts of uncompensated care becomes more apparent when one ex amines uncompensated care dollars expressed as a percentage of total revenue. Government hospitals continued to bear an increasing share of uncompensated care over the period 1983 to 1991. Uncompensated care dollars as a percentage of total revenues increased from 20.4 percent to 54.6 percent, a 34.2 percentage point increase. (In relative terms this change represents an increase of 168 percent.) The share and absolute increase experienced by NFP facilities was much smaller. Among this ownership group, uncompensated care dollars as a percentage of total revenue increased from 9 percent to 19-5 percent; this 10.5 absolute percentage point change is equivalent to a 117 percent relative increase. Proprietary hospitals experienced a 110 percent increase in uncompen sated care dollars as a percentage of revenue between 1983 and 1987 (from 5.3 percent to 10.6 percent). Yet between 1987 and 1991 this ratio declined from 10.6 percent to 9.2 percent. Hence, the net burden experienced by proprietary facilities over the period was a 3-9 percent age point increase (about 74 percent in relative terms). j.m . mticoeu ana j ./i . Norton The evidence presented in tables 2 and 3 suggests that the medically indigent and the underinsured have received substantial dollar amounts of uncompensated care and thus have probably caused significant finan cial hardship for certain providers, especially government and NFP in stitutions. The descriptive findings also imply that both the absolute increase and the growth rate of uncompensated care slowed considerably after 1987. To assess the implications of these trends, the effects of the PMATF on extending access to the uninsured and on hospitals render ing a disproportionate share of uncompensated care are evaluated below. 1984 -85 to $3,256 in FY 1992 . These expenditure increases were antici pated, however, as the Medicaid program significantly expanded both the categories of eligible persons as well as the range of services provided. Table 5 presents details indicating how the composition of the Med icaid caseload changed over the study period. Except for initial case loads, table 5 reflects the number of Medicaid eligibles at the end of each calendar year. The total number of Medicaid eligibles increased from about 500,000 to almost 1.6 million, or by about 218 percent between July 1985 and December 1994. Caseloads at the end of 1994 show that all of the targeted groups-categorically eligible, medically needy, pregnant women, children, the elderly, and the disabled-have been the primary beneficiaries of the expansions. Nonetheless, the ex pansions have also resulted in higher SSI and AFDC caseloads. While over 98 percent of the initial caseload was accounted for by persons who qualified for Medicaid under either SSI or AFDC, these two categories represented about 74 percent, or close to 1.2 million of the Medicaid population. Except for refugee assistance eligibles, the remaining 25 percent qualified for Medicaid under the expansions and federal man dates. Clearly, these Medicaid expansions have extended health care access to many previously uninsured Floridians.
The Impact of the Medicaid Expansions and PMATF on the Uninsured
The large increases in the AFDC and SSI populations document an unexpected consequence of the enrollment effort: the identification of a significant number of Medicaid eligibles who were also deemed to be eligible for cash assistance (AFDC or SSI). For example, the projected AFDC caseload without the medically needy expansions for FY 1988-89 was 99,776 families, or 276,380 persons (assuming average family size is 2.77 persons). The actual realized AFDC caseload was 113,646 fami lies, or 314,799 eligibles, about 14 percent higher than projected. A similar phenomenon occurred among the SSI population. In FY 1988-89, the SSI caseload projected without Medicaid expansions was 187,660, while the actual caseload was 201,771, or about 7.5 percent or 14,171 individuals above projections (Clarke 1989) . State officials did not anticipate that such a large proportion, about 60 percent of persons who enrolled in Medicaid during the expansions, would also qualify for cash assistance programs. Many potentially eli gible persons who qualified for cash assistance were not enrolled previ ously because (1) they did not have access to information about cash assistance and Medicaid programs; (2) they perceived the application process as burdensome; (3) they failed to apply because of the stigma attached to welfare programs. The extensive efforts undertaken to reach persons residing in low-income areas and a streamlined eligibility pro cess were probably the major reasons why administrative personnel were able to enroll a large number of persons who were not previously on the rolls. This evidence implies that extensive outreach efforts by state work ers to enroll eligible persons in Medicaid can result in substantial in creases in insurance coverage without changing any laws.
As shown in table 6, however, PMATF-funded eligibles represented a relatively small proportion of the population of Medicaid beneficiaries. In FY 1986-87, PMATF Medicaid eligibles accounted for less than 2 percent of all Medicaid beneficiaries. Yet, by FY 1988-89, there were almost 55,600 PMATF Medicaid eligibles, which represented about 8.5 Revenues from the PMATF were earmarked to increase access to care for the uninsured and to m itigate the financial problems associated with the provision of high levels of uncompensated care. Information docu menting the disbursements from, as well as the assessments contributed to, the PMATF by hospitals aggregated according to ownership cat egory is reported in table 7. A careful examination of these dollar figures reveals that the Florida revenue pool appears to be achieving the second of its two objectives: leveling the playing field among hospital providers. As expected, the largest share of the payments to hospitals for the Medicaid expansions was paid to N FP and public hospitals. NFP hospi tals received in excess of $560 million, or 55 percent, whereas the public facilities received close to $318 million, or 31 percent of total disburse ments for Medicaid expansions. In contrast, investor-owned hospitals received only 13 percent of the total PMATF revenues disbursed to hospitals for Medicaid expansions over the study period. Similar pat terns emerge regarding the direct reimbursements to hospitals (i.e., the one-time PMATF redistribution in 1987 and the DSH payments). Since 1987, hospitals meeting specific criteria related to patient mix have re ceived direct subsidies from the PMATF in excess of $209 million. NFP and government hospitals have received the largest shares of these pay ments: 44.7 percent and 45.6 percent, respectively. Less than 10 percent of these subsidy dollars have been given to investor-owned facilities. These results suggest that the revenue pool may be working as an ticipated. Overall, total disbursements from the PMATF to hospitals exceeded $1.2 billion, whereas assessments collected from hospitals over this period amounted to $740 million. Public hospitals appear to be the primary beneficiaries of the revenue pool, as these facilities contributed close to $110 million, or almost 15 percent of total assessments, but received about 34 percent, or $413 million, of total PMATF payments. The ratio of the excess of payments over assessments ($303 million) relative to assessments for government-owned hospitals was 2.76. NFP and proprietary hospitals have fared less well. NFP hospitals contrib uted $359 million, or roughly 48.5 percent, of total assessments and received almost $654 million, or about 53.6 percent of PMATF distri butions. The ratio of the excess of payments over assessments ($295 million) relative to assessments collected for N FP facilities was .82. Investor-owned facilities contributed nearly $271 million, or 36.6 per cent, of total assessments, yet received just under $153 million, or 12.5 percent, of the total PMATF disbursements. As a consequence, assess ments on proprietary hospitals exceeded the payments these facilities received from the PMATF by more than $118 million.
The major providers of uncompensated care were identified by ex amining hospital financial data. In 1983, the 16 major providers of uncompensated care rendered in excess of $269 million, or about 46 percent of uncompensated care statewide. Despite the passage of the HCAA, the amount of uncompensated care provided by these seven government and nine NFP hospitals continued to escalate through 1987. A reversal of these trends, however, occurred between 1987 and 1988, when half of these 16 hospitals experienced a decline in uncompensated care dollars for the first time since 1983. Moreover, for each of the other eight hospitals, the incremental change in dollars of uncompensated care was the smallest in five years. Nonetheless, by 1991 these 16 hos pitals still accounted for almost $811 million, or close to 47 percent of uncompensated care dollars statewide. All 16 hospitals, however, have received more from the PMATF, either as payments for Medicaid ser vices and/or as direct subsidies, than they have contributed in assess ments. W hile this finding suggests that the PMATF disbursements have provided some monetary relief to the major providers of uncom pensated care in the state, the existence of the revenue pool has not re sulted in the financial burden of this care being redistributed away from these hospitals.
P rovider Taxes as a F inancing M echanism for R evenue Pools
An im portant question to address is whether the provider assessments imposed on hospitals and four types of freestanding ancillary facilities constitute a stable source of financing for the PMATF. To evaluate this critical concern, we examine a breakdown of revenue sources and ex penditures from the PMATF by fiscal year since inception. This cash analysis, presented in table 8, excludes the federal match and thus only reflects the state's allocation of revenues to and expenditures from the PMATF. The relative contribution of provider taxes as a financing mecha nism can be evaluated by examining the share of total state PMATF revenues generated by assessments on hospitals and ancillary facilities. This relative share is expressed both with and without the beginning cash balance because large surpluses from the prior fiscal year tend to distort the relative contribution of revenues derived from provider as sessments in calculations that include the initial cash balance.
The relative share percentages (excluding the initial cash balances) show that from FY 1985-86 through FY 1989-90 the provider assessments accounted for between 73.6 percent and 78.4 percent of state PMATF revenues. The percentages that include the initial cash balance amounts are somewhat smaller because during this time period the PMATF had relatively large prior year surpluses. After FY 1989-90, however, the ini tial cash balances were relatively small as increasing expenditures nearly exhausted state-generated PMATF revenues. In FY 1990-91, the state legislature recognized that expenditures on Medicaid expansions would exceed projected PMATF dollars generated through provider assessments and the $30 million general revenue appropriation. In response, the leg islature passed a ten cents per pack increase in the state cigarette tax, which yielded $123.4 million and increased the PMATF general revenue ap propriation to $ 123• 1 million. Although the actual dollar amounts gen erated by the provider assessments increased between FY 1990-91 and FY 1993-94 , the share of PMATF dollars attributable to the assessments (excluding the initial cash balance) has remained relatively stable. None theless, the cigarette tax increase has proved to be a declining source of revenue; the general revenue appropriation's share of PMATF funds has increased from 30 percent in FY 1990 -91 to about 46 percent in FY 1993 
Regarding expenditures, most of the PMATF dollars are allocated to Medicaid expansions and state-sponsored primary care programs. Even though the one-time redistribution of $69-5 million represented 39 percent of PMATF expenditures in FY 1988-89, the DSH payments made in each of the four subsequent fiscal years accounted for small shares of total state trust fund expenditures. DSH payments represented 16, 6.6, 1.3, and 2.7 percent of state PMATF dollars, respectively, in the four-year period beginning w ith FY 1988-89-Thus, in accordance with the original legislation, most of the PMATF dollars are used to extend health insurance coverage to previously uninsured persons.
Conclusions and Policy Im p licatio n s
In recent years many states have implemented some form of provider tax in an attem pt to address the problem of uncompensated hospital dollars stemming from services rendered to the medically indigent and under insured. In this study we conducted descriptive analyses of one such revenue pool implemented by the state of Florida in 1984: the Public Medical Assistance Trust Fund. We recognize that descriptive studies are limited because they may only suggest associations and trends that may disappear if a more rigorous multivariate framework is employed. Nevertheless, because no prior study has evaluated the impact of the Florida revenue pool on uncompensated care and the uninsured, the insights that can be gleaned from such descriptive analyses of this unique financing mechanism are of particular value. First, the Florida approach provides policy makers with considerable discretion in the allocation of funds. Second, unlike other states w ith revenue pools, Florida targets most of the PMATF dollars toward extending medical insurance to the uninsured. The Florida approach, therefore, avoids the "leaky bucket" problem of most other existing revenue pools, which allocate the funds solely to reimburse hospitals for previous levels of uncompensated care (Thorpe 1987 (Thorpe , 1988 . W hen lum p sum payments are made to hospitals that render high volumes of uncompensated care, it is unclear whether any of the monies are used to extend care to the uninsured. Moreover, under the Florida approach, funds are directed toward services provided in more cost-effective, primary care settings rather than in expensive hospitals. Os in
a g s 5 3 -g 3 ŷ W hile the merits of this funding approach are clear, opponents regard this mechanism as a "sick tax" because it imposes the costs of charity care on the providers who are subject to the tax. Another criticism is that most programs tend to compensate hospitals according to existing patterns of utilization, irrespective of whether such care is provided efficiently and effectively. A third potential shortcoming may arise if the assessment is only imposed on specific providers like hospitals. If so, the assessments may fail to generate sufficient funding to implement sub stantial extensions of insurance coverage to previously uninsured per sons. Further, even though consumers regard such assessments as a tax on providers, critics also contend that these extra costs are eventually passed on to consumers as higher prices. Nonetheless, the ability of hospitals to raise prices in this era of managed care and intense compe tition for patients is quite limited. Clearly, alternative sources of fund ing, such as a general tax on health insurance premiums or income taxation, could generate substantial amounts of revenue. Yet these op tions are politically unpopular because consumers recognize that such taxes alter their consumption and savings behavior directly.
O ur findings, although only descriptive, suggest that the PMATF has been at least partially successful at achieving its objectives. First, the PMATF has helped to provide insurance coverage to medically indigent and previously uninsured persons. The categorically eligible, the medi cally needy, pregnant women, children, the elderly and the disabled have been the primary beneficiaries of these expansions. While the HCAA and the PMATF represent significant attempts at increasing access to care for the uninsured, slightly less than 40 percent of the growth in Medicaid-eligible persons can be attributed to the PMATF. The other 60 percent can be linked to congressional mandates expanding access to pregnant women and children, as well as state changes in AFDC eligi bility criteria.
Second, the PMATF appears to have partially fulfilled its goal of redistributing the financial burdens associated with the provision of uncompensated care services. Public hospitals appear to be the primary beneficiaries of the revenue pool, as these facilities contributed 15 per cent of total hospital assessments but received 34 percent of PMATF disbursements (including Medicaid expansion reimbursements and DSH payments). In contrast, proprietary hospitals, which typically treat rela tively few indigents, contributed 36.6 percent of hospital assessments, yet received only 12.5 percent of PMATF disbursements. Moreover, those hospitals that rendered the greatest dollar amounts of uncompen sated care have received disbursements (Medicaid reimbursements and DSH payments) that exceed their PMATF assessments. The direct sub sidy payments, nonetheless, cover only a small share of prior year un compensated care dollars generated by individual hospitals. In the future, these circumstances may be exacerbated as a result of the contractual arrangements that exist between state Medicaid programs and hospitals providing large volumes of care to Medicaid-eligible individuals.
Third, although the provider tax yields a stable source of financing for the Florida revenue pool, it does not generate sufficient dollars to keep pace w ith the rapid growth in expenditures associated w ith in creases in Medicaid eligibles. D uring the period FY 1985-86 through FY 1989-90, the provider assessments accounted for 73.6 to 78.4 per cent of state PMATF revenues. For the more recent four-year period (FY 1990 (FY -91 through 1993 , the share of PMATF revenues (excluding the initial cash balance) generated via provider assessments was about 37 percent. Unfortunately, because anticipated expenditures exceed rev enue projections generated by the provider assessments and earmarked cigarette tax dollars, the legislature has been forced to increase state general revenue appropriations to keep the PMATF viable. The fund has been gradually depleted because the monies generated from the assess ment tax are not sufficient to cover the costs of programs enacted to alleviate uncompensated care. To reduce the need and reliance on in creasing appropriations from state general revenues, policy makers must identify other sources of funding that can be earmarked to cover the costs of medical care for those w ith inadequate insurance.
Several revenue-generating mechanisms m ight be implemented to gen erate the additional funds. Since the state has already expanded the base of the assessment tax to ambulatory surgical centers, diagnostic imag ing, clinical labs, and radiation therapy centers, one possibility is to ex tend the funding base even further by taxing other licensed health care entities such as home health agencies, nursing homes, and rehabilitation clinics. Moreover, as was proposed recently in Minnesota, the funding base could be further augmented by imposing assessments on physicians and dentists. A second alternative is to establish a state inheritance and estate tax. W hile the advantages of these potential revenue sources are evident, their political feasibility is nevertheless highly debatable.
The initiatives to expand coverage to uninsured persons in Florida have im portant implications for the recent movement to implement universal health insurance nationally. It is widely recognized that the most difficult issue facing policy makers concerns how to finance such coverage. Clearly, Florida's approach of financing expansions in insur ance coverage via a revenue pool merits serious consideration because the funds are earmarked for this specific purpose. The Florida experience demonstrates that the more difficult challenge concerns the underlying financing of the revenue pool itself. The provider tax appears to be a useful tool to generate the initial funding to expand health insurance coverage, yet if applied to only a few types of health care facilities, the assessments will not generate sufficient amounts of revenue to finance substantial change. If, however, the provider assessment were to be imposed on a wide range of facilities, and perhaps even certain types of health care professionals, it could generate significant amounts of rev enue to finance substantial expansions of health insurance coverage. Otherwise, an increasing percentage of the revenue pool must be fi nanced through general appropriations. W hile politically controversial, it appears that provider assessments imposed on a wide range of health care facilities, and possibly even certain types of health care profession als, may represent a viable approach to financing the expansion of health insurance to the uninsured.
